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Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Letter dated 28 March 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the parliaments of the European States, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in connection with the attacks carried out against banking institutions in Ukraine (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 31 of the current session.

(Signed) P. Illichev
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the letter dated 28 March 2017 from the Chargé
d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

**Statement of the seventh convocation of the State Duma of the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the parliaments of
the European States, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in connection with
the attacks carried out against banking institutions in Ukraine**

The deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation express strong indignation over the attacks carried out against banking institutions in Ukraine, which reached their peak on 14 and 15 March 2017. These illegal actions paralysed the activity of Sberbank and Alpha Bank, where millions of investors and customers keep their funds and which employ thousands of Ukrainian citizens.

The law enforcement agencies of Ukraine did not take any steps to prevent the illegal actions that endangered the life and health of employees at these institutions. For the first time in the history of modern Europe, the employees of the banking institutions were effectively shut in the rooms which were under attack while representatives of the Ukrainian State authorities, through their statements, incited neo-Nazis to commit acts of violence.

The President of Ukraine, rather than fulfilling his constitutional obligations to maintain law and order, ordered sanctions to be imposed on banking institutions with Russian capital which have been registered in full conformity with Ukrainian legislation, hold significant participating interest in the national banking system of Ukraine and scrupulously comply with the requirements of Ukrainian law.

Evidently, these actions do not comply with the norms of international law, including the obligations of Ukraine with regard to the Council of Europe and under the European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement. They also erode the investment climate in Ukraine and deepen the already dismal economic situation in the country.

The deputies of the State Duma call on European colleagues who voted for the ratification of the European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement to make effective use of their powers to prevent the crimes and violence in Ukraine and to provide an adequate assessment of the actions of the official Ukrainian authorities.

History teaches us that it is a dangerous policy to turn a blind eye to neo-Nazi activities. The crime spree and outbreaks of violence in Ukraine must be brought to an end.

(Signed) V. V. Volodin
Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly
of the Russian Federation
Moscow, 17 March 2017



**General Assembly
Security Council**

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**General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 61
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace**

**Security Council
Seventy-second year**

**Letter dated 7 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 6 April 2017 with regard to the fact that the level of political, military and economic pressure and aggressive schemes of the US against the DPRK is now beyond the danger limit (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ja Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 7 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Memorandum released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 6 April 2017 with regard to the level of political, military and economic pressure and aggressive schemes of the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now being beyond the danger limit

The level of political, military and economic pressure and aggressive schemes of the US against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is now beyond the danger limit.

It is without any hesitancy that heinous acts are committed to insult our supreme dignity. "Special operations" aimed at "getting rid of the headquarters of the north" are in an open preparation in the real stage.

The US is now staging military exercises against the DPRK at our doorstep, mobilizing the largest-ever aggression forces and state-of-the art nuclear striking means. They even threw off the deceptive veil, as they said the military exercises were of a "defensive nature".

Not content with this, the US is trying to disturb our socialist construction by imposing the toughest economic sanctions and blockades. Furthermore, it has revealed its open bid to cause economic suffocation against the DPRK.

The situation on the Korean peninsula has come to the pass where it is no longer in control due to extreme provocative and aggressive war moves conducted by the US, which have followed the path of getting worse.

If war sparks off on the Korean peninsula, there will come up the issue of accounting for war provocation and post-war follow-up.

It is against this background that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the DPRK releases this memorandum in order to lay open the gravity and illegality of the aggressive schemes of the US, which is now driving the Korean peninsula situation to thermonuclear war, as well as the justness and legality of the inevitable defensive choice of the DPRK to cope with the US schemes.

It is more often than not that the DPRK has already warned that the grave aggressive acts would be considered as a declaration of war whenever the US and its vassal forces committed grave provocations. It has also made it clear that the provokers should be held accountable for all the grave consequences arising from them.

The following examples are telltale evidence of all of them:

- The Bush administration, after taking office, declared as its State policy to negate our system by designating the DPRK as an "axis of evil". It even openly declared nuclear war against the DPRK by putting it as a target of pre-emptive nuclear strike (see 10 January 2003 statement of DPRK government)
- The US is engrossed in the mean tricks of a smear campaign to tarnish the image of the DPRK system, groundlessly charging it with drug smuggling, counterfeiting of money, suppression of religious freedom, exodus of refugees, human trafficking, training of computer hackers and arms sale, etc.

At the same time, it is hampering the routine service of DPRK-flagged trading vessels under various pretexts. This hostile act is, in fact, little short of a sea blockade against the DPRK.

No matter how desperately the US may try to cover up these moves, they are, in the final analysis, acts of scrapping the Armistice Agreement and a declaration of war. In the long run, it is an act of war (18 June 2003 statement of the MFA spokesman).

- The Bush administration was undisguised in its attempt to seek a "regime change" in those countries, including the DPRK, which stood independent and are not obedient to what it had dictated upon them by means of pre-emptive strike while labelling them "outposts of tyranny".

The "National Security Strategy Report" announced this time reveals, in a nutshell, the US intention to start a war to prevent nuclear proliferation, "combat terrorism" and "spread democracy". It is, therefore, nothing but a brigandish document declaring a war, as it is an indication that the Bush regime will not rule out even a war to bring down those countries which refuse to follow its ideology and value by branding them as enemies without exception (21 March 2006 statement of the MFA spokesman).

- The US has become more frantic in its military exercises and arms build-up on the peninsula and in its vicinity for the purpose of launching the second Korean War since it made a de facto "declaration of war" against the DPRK through the recent brigandish adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution

At the same time, it is making desperate efforts to internationalize the sanctions and blockade against the DPRK by leaving no dastardly means and methods untried in a foolish attempt to isolate and stifle it economically and bring down the socialist system chosen by its people themselves.

The Bush administration has gone to the length of making an ultimatum that it would punish the DPRK if it refuses to yield to the US within the timetable set by it (3 October 2006 statement of the MFA).

- The United States instigated the United Nations Security Council to pass another "resolution" calling for harsh international sanctions and a blockade against the DPRK, unreasonably describing its nuclear test for self-defence as a "threat" to international peace and security.

The United Nations Security Council "resolution", needless to say, cannot be construed otherwise than as a declaration of a war against the DPRK (17 October 2006 statement of the MFA spokesman).

- The United Nations Security Council, at the instigation of the US, has finally adopted a "resolution on sanctions" against the DPRK over its second nuclear test.

An attempted blockade of any kind by the US and its followers will be regarded as an act of war and met with a decisive military response (13 June 2009 statement of the MFA).

- Human rights precisely mean the right to independence and the national sovereignty of a relevant country. Therefore, the brigandish "resolution" against the DPRK's genuine human rights means the most undisguised war declaration to infringe upon its sovereignty (23 November 2014 statement of the DPRK National Defence Commission)

- The Obama administration, too, excluded the DPRK from the list of the "nuclear non-use" in April of 2010, fully revealing its scenario for mounting a

pre-emptive attack on the DPRK. Through this, it has revealed its open bid to launch a nuclear pre-emptive strike against the DPRK. It continues even now to profess about it. The US has staged large-scale joint military drills every year and made practical preparations for a nuclear attack on the DPRK by mobilizing various types of nuclear hardware to be used in the war.

The aggressive nature and danger of these exercises lies in the fact that the US threw off the deceptive mask of "annual" and "defensive" it has veiled so far and is examining the "decapitation raid" aiming at our supreme headquarters and the tactics of "high-density strike" at our strategic strike means in practice and openly committing reckless provocations like the "precision strike drill" to destroy the office room of our supreme headquarters; herein lies the aggressive and dangerous character of the co-military exercise.

There is no country or government in the world which will tolerate such a challenge of maniacs running amok to eliminate the headquarters of a sovereign State through special operations (31 March 2016 statement of the MFA spokesman).

- What's more serious is that various types of offensive operations, including the "decapitation raid" aiming at our supreme headquarters, the "operation for advancing into Pyongyang" and the "precision strike drill" aimed at destroying the office of our supreme leadership, have been carried out in actual manoeuvres in accordance with "OPLAN-5015"

The war rehearsals were the largest-ever manoeuvres hostile to the DPRK, as it was manifest in the drills that the US scenario and moves to physically eliminate the DPRK reached an extremely dangerous phase.

It is tantamount to an open declaration of war against the DPRK that the US, kicking off the drills, openly revealed its attempt to mount a pre-emptive attack on the DPRK after discarding even the spurious mask of "defensive" (30 April 2016 statement of the MFA spokesman).

- The supreme leadership of the DPRK, which its servicepersons and civilians have safeguarded at the cost of their lives while following with all sincerity, represents the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK and the destiny of the Korean army and people

But the US dared to challenge the dignity of the DPRK supreme leadership, an act reminiscent of a newborn puppy knowing no fear of a tiger. This is the worst hostility and an open declaration of war against the DPRK, as it has gone far beyond the confrontation over the "human rights issue".

Now that the US has overstepped the "red line" in the showdown with the DPRK by perpetrating such a thrice-cursed crime, the DPRK came to have the legitimate rights to take all necessary countermeasures (7 July 2016 statement of the MFA).

- The General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA) warns the hideous provocateurs as follows with regard to the situation that has reached an extreme phase which should no longer be overlooked:

1. The General Staff declares the KPA's stand to mercilessly smash the enemy's moves with its own style of special operation and pre-emptive attack, now that the sinister aim of the US imperialists and the south Korean war maniacs' "special operation" to hurt the dignity of the DPRK's supreme leadership has become clear and they have disclosed even the dangerous attempt at "pre-emptive attack".

2. They should be mindful that the KPA will deal deadly blows without prior warning at any time as long as the operational means and troops of the US and south Korean puppet forces involved in the "special operation" and "pre-emptive attack" targeting the DPRK remain deployed in and around south Korea.

3. Once the enemy launches the said "operation and strike", they will only bring about a historic event in which the US imperialists will face a miserable doom and the south Korean puppet forces a final ruin (26 March 2017 warning by spokesman for the KPA General Staff).

Our serious warning goes not to each US administration. It rather goes to the US itself. Despite this, the US gets more intensive in its act to run counter to our repeated warning in defiance of them.

Provocative remarks viciously picking on our supreme dignity, which are as grave as a declaration of war, are pouring out from the US without hesitation.

The US threw off its veil of "defensive nature" used at the time of the past joint military exercises and is now mobilizing nuclear strategic assets like striking groups of the nuclear carrier *Carl Vinson* and strategic bomber B-1B thus to cause the worst threat of a nuclear pre-emptive strike against the DPRK.

Worse still, it does not hide the fact that the scenario of "special operation" being staged by the ill-famed special warfare units is mainly aimed at carrying out the "beheading operation" for "removing the headquarters of the north" and the "pre-emptive attack" operation for blowing up nuclear and rocket bases.

While cooking up the illegal "sanctions resolutions" and forcing other countries to carry them out, the US is now enforcing separate sanctions to stamp out the DPRK's right to existence and development by all possible means.

They are making frantic efforts to isolate and stifle the DPRK as evidenced by the adoption of three "sanctions resolutions" against the DPRK on 29 March alone.

Nuclear threat and blackmail, sanctions and blockade by the US have never stopped, even for a day. But it was never waged as it is now in its frantic nature. All this means that its moves have gone over the hostile acts into full-scale war.

The present US administration is committing itself to its anti-DPRK campaign in an unprecedented way. Because of this, the Korean peninsula is now in a war situation. It is from this that the DPRK was compelled to put into practice the repeated warning it had so far sent to the US while displaying its maximum restraint.

According to universally accepted international laws, the heinous acts of the US and its vassal forces to stifle the DPRK are an apparent act and crime of war.

The code of offences against the peace and security of mankind, adopted at the sixth session of the International Law Commission (3 June to 28 July 1954), defined the preparation for use of arms by one State against another State as a crime against the peace and security of mankind.

Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations stated that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, in its article 9, stated that "Every State has an obligation of refraining itself from the use of war as a means of State policy, stand against territorial integrity and political independence of another State or threat or use of arms through other means inconsistent with international law and order".

The Convention for the Definition of Aggression, as well as the resolution entitled "Definition of aggression", adopted at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, defined the sanctions entailing the blockade of a sovereign State in a time of peace as an act of aggression and illegal.

Article 2 (definition of aggression) of that Convention stipulated that a State which is the first to commit acts, without a declaration of war, such as an attack by its land, naval or air forces on the territory, ship or airplane of another, as well as the naval blockade of the other's coast or port, is regarded as an aggressor State in terms of international disputes according to the existing convention between disputing parties.

The fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution to condemn any act of armed aggression or threat or use of force against peoples, their elected Governments or their legitimate leaders.

Paragraph 15, article II, of the Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA) stipulated as follows: "This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea".

However, the US has imposed an ever more intensive blockade on the DPRK, thus scraping off even the paragraph banning naval blockades, the last one of KAA which had been valid merely for form's sake.

As seen above, the US is now performing practical acts of aggression and war against the DPRK through extreme military threats and blackmail and blockade-style sanctions, blatantly violating universally accepted international laws.

It is a legitimate right of the DPRK to make a resolute pre-emptive attack to thoroughly frustrate the moves for imminent and full-phased aggression and war made by the US against the DPRK.

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, on the right of self-defence, and article 12 of the Declaration on Rights and Duties of States clearly stipulated that every State is entitled to the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, adopted on 16 December 1970, stipulated that "States must fully respect the sovereignty of other States and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies, free of external intervention, coercion or constraint, especially involving the threat or use of force, overt or covert, and restrain from any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country".

Article 40 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land also provided that violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately.

The option taken by the DPRK to defend itself from the moves of hostility and war of the US would be a great war of justice to completely remove the bases of aggression and achieve national reunification, the long-cherished desire of the Korean nation.

The DPRK was founded by the general election involving both the north and south of Korea and by the general will of the entire Korean population. Since the south Korean authorities have flatly rejected the DPRK's proposal to found a

reunified federal state leaving the ideologies and systems existing in the north and the south intact, the DPRK's great war of justice would be a fair and righteous exercise of the sovereign right of the State to reclaim the territory occupied by foreign forces, and it can never be condemned as "an act of aggression" on any account.

In case a war breaks out in the Korean peninsula, the US will be held totally accountable for it, no matter who launched a pre-emptive attack, as it has constantly escalated its hostile policy towards the DPRK and driven the situation to the outbreak of war by deploying huge amount of nuclear strategic assets and special warfare means in the Korean peninsula.

The DPRK's mode of attack, once launched, would be a precision strike to destroy only the military bases of the US and its vassal forces targeting the DPRK. The DPRK will abide by the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, as a signatory to it.

As already declared, the DPRK will also take all responsible measures for protecting the legal economic interests of other countries that they hold in south Korea.

The international community should clearly understand the gravity of the situation created in the Korean peninsula by the US moves for aggression and war, and respect the option taken by the DPRK to defend itself.

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Human resources management

Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: a new approach**Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions****I. Introduction**

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered an advance version of the report of the Secretary-General on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: a new approach (A/71/818 and Add.1). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 28 March 2017. An advance version of the addendum to the report of the Secretary-General was provided to the Advisory Committee during the course of its consideration of the item.

II. Background and context

2. The Advisory Committee recalls that, following allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Central African Republic that came to light in 2014, in June 2015, the Secretary-General appointed the External Independent Review Panel on the United Nations response to allegations of sexual abuse by foreign military forces in the Central African Republic.¹ In its resolution 69/307, the General Assembly expressed concern about the response of the United Nations to the allegations of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse in the Central African Republic, and welcomed the establishment of an external independent review panel. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report expeditiously to it on the findings of the review and on the lessons learned and measures for improvement no later than at the main part of its seventieth session.

¹ Press release SG/SM/16864-SG/A/1578 of 22 June 2015. Available from www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16864.doc.htm.



3. In its resolution 70/286, the General Assembly noted with concern the findings in the independent review, including on the flaws in the United Nations system response, and requested the Secretary-General to report on lessons learned and measures to improve the system-wide response to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and to uphold the highest standards of transparency, efficiency and accountability (see also A/70/729 and A/70/742). In the same resolution, the Assembly welcomed the appointment of the Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,² and requested the Secretary-General to regularly update Member States on progress with respect to her mandate.

4. Also in its resolution 70/286, the General Assembly, *inter alia*: (a) highlighted the importance of providing expeditious support to victims; (b) noted with appreciation the establishment of the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and decided to approve the transfer of withheld payments in substantiated cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by civilian, military and police personnel to the Trust Fund; (c) called upon the Secretary-General to ensure coordination across United Nations entities at the country level in order for victims to receive immediate basic assistance and support; (d) welcomed the strong commitment of the troop-contributing countries to the United Nations policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse; (e) reiterated the importance of further improving the collaboration between the Secretary-General and the troop- and police-contributing countries, emphasizing the need to maintain frequent exchange of information; (f) recognized the risk factors linked to recent allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, as identified by the Secretary-General in his report on the subject (A/70/729); (g) requested the Secretary-General to use the proposed reporting methodology and template for all United Nations uniformed and civilian personnel and non-United Nations forces operating under a Security Council mandate; and (h) also requested the Secretary-General to immediately inform the Member States concerned about allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

5. In response to the request made by the General Assembly in resolution 70/286, the Secretary-General submitted his report on combating sexual exploitation and abuse (A/71/97) for consideration by the Assembly at the main part of its seventy-first session. The report provided information and updates on, *inter alia*: (a) the initiatives undertaken across the United Nations system to combat sexual exploitation and abuse, since February 2016, including those under way at the time to address the recommendations of the External Independent Review Panel, and a broad range of systemic issues related to how the United Nations responds to allegations; (b) measures for the implementation of Security Council resolution 2272 (2016); (c) Member State engagement and emerging best practices in United Nations troop and police deployments; (d) system-wide coordination, strengthened prevention and enhanced response to victims, including services and protection; (e) strengthened reporting, investigation and accountability efforts; and (f) placing greater focus on the monitoring and reporting of sexual exploitation and abuse by non-United Nations forces.

6. In its related report (A/71/643), the Advisory Committee welcomed the appointment of the Special Coordinator. The Committee noted the continued fragmentation of the response of the various United Nations entities dealing with such matters and the need for a more coherent framework for preventive and responsive actions. In addition, the Committee stressed the need for a more streamlined method of reporting and to ensure that information is transmitted to Member States in a

² The Special Coordinator was initially appointed by the Secretary-General on 1 March 2016 for a period of 11 months, funded under extrabudgetary resources.

timely manner. The report of the Secretary-General (A/71/97) and related report of the Advisory Committee (A/71/643) are currently before the General Assembly.

7. In January 2017, the Secretary-General established a high-level task force, led by the Special Coordinator, to develop as a matter of urgency a strategy to achieve visible and measurable improvements in the way the Organization prevents and responds to sexual exploitation and abuse.³

8. In February 2017, the Advisory Committee indicated that it concurred with the Secretary-General's request to extend the period of the mandate of the Special Coordinator, at the Under-Secretary-General level, in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, for a one-year period, until 31 January 2018, funded from extrabudgetary resources, under the authority conferred upon the Committee by the General Assembly in section II, paragraph 2, of its resolution 35/217 of 17 December 1980.

9. In its resolution 71/278 of 10 March 2017 on United Nations action on sexual exploitation and abuse, the General Assembly expressed its support to the Secretary-General, the Office of the Special Coordinator and all relevant departments in their efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, welcomed the establishment of the high-level task force, and reiterated several requests and issues that had been highlighted in its resolution 70/286 (see para. 4 above). In addition, in resolution 71/278, the Assembly inter alia: (a) recognized that a culture of impunity could result in an increase in sexual exploitation and abuse; (b) underscored that victims of sexual exploitation and abuse should be at the core of the United Nations efforts in implementing the zero-tolerance policy; (c) stressed that enhanced transparency of credible reporting of allegations contributed positively to the effectiveness of the United Nations in combating sexual exploitation and abuse; (d) requested the Secretary-General to continue to promote effective coordination and collaboration with regard to the audit, evaluation and investigation functions of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in order to ensure an integrated approach to oversight; and (e) decided to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-second session an item entitled "Sexual exploitation and abuse: implementing a zero-tolerance policy".

III. Key aspects of the report of the Secretary-General

10. In his most recent report on the subject (A/71/818 and Add.1), the Secretary-General set out his strategy for improving the Organization's system-wide approach to preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse. The strategy focuses on four main areas of action as summarized below:

(a) Putting the rights and dignity of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse at the forefront of efforts (see A/71/818, paras. 20-38), including: (i) the introduction of victims' assistance support functions at Headquarters and field locations, including through the victims' rights advocate functions; (ii) the establishment of a system-wide, consolidated confidential repository of case information, building on the existing Misconduct Tracking System developed by the Department of Field Support; (iii) a protocol developed by the Secretary-General on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse as part of the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations where heightened risk exists, including guidelines on non-fraternization and prohibitions on the consumption of alcohol, and proposals for the improvement of welfare and living conditions; and (iv) a variety of other measures, such as a revision of the terms of

³ Press release SG/A/1697 of 6 January 2017. Available from www.un.org/press/en/2106/sga1697.doc.htm.

reference of the Trust Fund to permit direct assistance payments to victims to allow them, for example, to attend trials and the establishment of procedures to withhold reimbursements to troop- and police-contributing countries in the event that investigations are not undertaken, reported on and concluded in a timely manner and to transfer the amounts withheld to the Trust Fund;

(b) Ending impunity (*ibid.*, paras. 39-63), including strengthened measures in reporting, investigations and follow-up to hold to account the individuals responsible; the creation of a voluntary compact between the Secretary-General and Member States with the objective of defining the specific commitments of the Organization and Member States in advancing joint efforts to combat sexual exploitation and abuse, and strengthened of measures to ensure that United Nations partners and non-United Nations forces uphold the standards set for the United Nations;

(c) Building a multi-stakeholder network to support the United Nations in its efforts to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse;

(d) Raising awareness and sharing best practices to end sexual exploitation and abuse.

11. In his report, the Secretary-General also raised the issue of the initial screening of candidates for every United Nations post as a part of pre-recruitment procedures and signalled his intention for the Secretariat to explore the possible use of commercial services for that purpose. In that regard, the Advisory Committee recalls the observations made, in its related report on the sixth report on the accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat, on the Misconduct Tracking System maintained by the Department of Field Support. The Committee stressed in particular the need for a single system-wide tracking system to cover all forms of misconduct thereby ensuring a comprehensive and consistent system of vetting that avoids any duplication of effort. (see A/71/820, para. 24; see also A/70/718, para. 22).

12. Further information is contained in the annexes to the report of the Secretary-General (A/71/818), set out as follows: annex I contains, for each of the above-mentioned four areas, a summary of the proposed actions and recommendations and an indication of the relevant lead department; annex II contains a list of best practices of Member States on prevention of and response to sexual exploitation and abuse; and annex III contains information on prior system-wide initiatives and proposals on addressing sexual exploitation and abuse, in the areas of prevention, protection measures and victim assistance and response, in terms of investigations and accountability.

13. In addition, pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 57/306 and 70/286, annex IV to the report of the Secretary-General contains data on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse reported across the United Nations system and by non-United Nations international forces authorized by a Security Council mandate, in 2016. The data includes: (a) information on the nature of the allegations reported for peacekeeping operations and special political missions and other entities; (b) the status of investigations related to the allegations; and (c) the allegations reported to OIOS for peacekeeping operations and special political missions, allegations reported to the Office of Human Resources Management for other entities, and allegations reported to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

14. With reference to annex III to the report of the Secretary-General containing details on prior system-wide initiatives and proposals on addressing sexual exploitation and abuse, the Advisory Committee was provided, upon enquiry, with an update with regard to the target completion dates of those initiatives that were not yet fully implemented and the new initiatives in each category, namely prevention;

response in terms of investigations; and response in terms of accountability, which is contained in annex I to the present report.

15. The Secretary-General requested the General Assembly to endorse or take note of a series of measures listed in paragraphs 79 (a) to (j) of his report. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that most of the measures set out in paragraph 79 of the report of the Secretary-General constitute policy matters to be decided by the General Assembly.**

IV. Resource requirements

16. In the addendum to his report, the Secretary-General provided information on the estimated resource requirements and related funding arrangements for the measures indicated in his report. Those requirements comprise a total of 12 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 6 positions at the P-5 level, 2 at the P-4 level, 1 at the P-3 level and 1 General Service (Other level)), as well as other related non-post requirements, to be met from the programme budget, the budgets of peacekeeping operations and the extrabudgetary resources available to the Organization. In that connection, the Secretary General indicated his intention to establish two offices, both reporting in parallel to the Chef de Cabinet in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, as follows:

(a) An Office of the Victims' Rights Advocate comprising eight positions, as follows: (i) four temporary positions, to be funded under the programme budget, comprising one position for a senior human rights expert to serve as the Victims' Rights Advocate, at the Assistant Secretary-General level, heading the office, supported by one position of Human Rights Officer (P-4), one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-3) and one position of Administrative Assistant (General Service (Other level)); and (ii) four positions, to be funded under peacekeeping budgets, of Victims' Rights Advocate (P-5) to be located at those peacekeeping missions with the largest number of sexual exploitation and abuse cases, namely, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan;

(b) An Office of the Special Coordinator, funded through extrabudgetary resources, comprising the position of Special Coordinator (Under-Secretary-General) heading the Office, supported by one position of Senior Coordination/Political Affairs Officer (P-5), one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4), and one position of Senior Policy and Outreach Officer (P-5).

17. As indicated in paragraph 7 of the addendum to the report of the Secretary-General (A/71/818/Add.1), the resource requirements for the two offices would amount to \$2,205,500, distributed under the 2016-2017 programme budget, 2017/18 peacekeeping budgets, and extrabudgetary resources for 2017, as follows:

(a) An amount of \$455,300 under the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 to cover the indicated requirements for the four temporary positions in the Office of the Victims' Rights Advocate as well as other related non-post costs for the period from 1 July 2017 to 31 December 2017 (see para. 16 (a) (i) above). The Secretary-General indicated his intention to use his commitment authority on limited budgetary discretion, granted to him under resolution 70/248 of 23 December 2015, in order to absorb, within the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, the costs of the above-mentioned four temporary positions;

(b) An amount of \$1,180,000 under peacekeeping budgets for the financial period from 1 July 2017 to 31 June 2018 to cover the requirements for the establishment of the four positions of Victims' Rights Advocate (P-5) and related non-post costs in each of four peacekeeping missions with the largest number of cases (see para. 16 (a) (ii) above). The Secretary-General indicated his intention to absorb the requirements within the budgets of the respective peacekeeping missions for the financial period 2017/18;

(c) An amount of \$570,200 in extrabudgetary funds to meet the post and related non-post requirements for the four positions in the Office of the Special Coordinator for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2017 (see para. 16 (a) above). As indicated in the addendum, the position of Under-Secretary-General has been funded since 1 March 2016 and approved through 31 January 2018 by the Advisory Committee (see also para. 8 above), and the estimated extrabudgetary resources reflect funding for the Under-Secretary-General position for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2017 for comparison purposes and to provide a full picture of the resource requirements over the indicated period.

18. With regard to the Secretary-General's stated intention to request that the above positions be formally established in mission staffing tables (see A/71/818, para. 30), the Advisory Committee emphasises that proposals for the establishment of regular budget and peacekeeping posts and positions must be submitted for approval by the General Assembly in the context of the relevant budget documents.

19. The Advisory Committee sought clarification as to how the estimated requirements for the four positions of Victims' Rights Advocate (P-5) would be absorbed in the peacekeeping budgets of the respective missions for the 2017/18 period, given that those budgets have not yet been submitted for consideration or approved by the General Assembly, and whether the budgets in question would be amended to reflect the requirements for those positions (see A/71/818/Add.1, para. 5; see also para. 16 (b) above). The Advisory Committee was informed that, should the General Assembly approve the functions of those positions (see para. 18 above), proposals for dedicated positions would be included in future budget submissions. With regard to the 2017/18 financial period, the Advisory Committee would be informed, during the 2017/18 period, should the Controller decide to authorize the establishment of the four temporary positions in question. The additional resources would be absorbed within the approved resources for 2017/18 and reported on in the context of the performance report. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will ensure full transparency in addressing this issue. The Committee further emphasises that, should the Secretary-General decide to proceed as indicated above for the functions of any of the four abovementioned positions during the implementation of the 2017/18 budgets of the missions in question, the proposals, if any, that the Secretary-General may wish to make for the establishment of the positions of Victims' Rights Advocate (P-5) would have to be included in the 2018/19 proposed budgets of the relevant missions for consideration by the General Assembly during its second resumed seventy-second session.**

20. Furthermore, should the Secretary-General decide to use his commitment authority on limited budgetary discretion granted to him under resolution 70/248 to absorb the costs of the above-mentioned four temporary positions under the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 (see A/71/818/Add.1; see also para. 16 (a) above), the Advisory Committee trusts that, in exercising his authority, the Secretary-General will ensure strict application of the nine principles contained in resolution 60/283 of the General Assembly (see annex II to the present report) and, furthermore, that he will provide full justifications

on the use of those resources in the second performance report for the biennium 2016-2017. In that regard, the Advisory Committee recalls General Assembly resolution 70/248 A (sect. II, para. 2) and paragraph 14 of the related report of the Advisory Committee (A/70/7/Add.5).

21. The Advisory Committee trusts that any future proposals that the Secretary-General may submit on the Office of the Special Coordinator and/or the Office of the Victims' Rights Advocate will include details on the proposed structures and rationale for their placement within the Organization, as well as on the number, grade levels, functions and reporting lines of the posts and positions proposed. Full justification for any proposed requirements should be provided, taking into account all existing resources dedicated to dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse issues across the Secretariat, as well as at other relevant United Nations system entities. Furthermore, should the Secretary-General decide to submit such a proposal for approval by the General Assembly, consideration should be given to the application of a cost-sharing formula for apportioning costs among different funding sources, as was the case for other Organization-wide initiatives, such as Umoja.

Annex I

Status of ongoing initiatives and proposals for combating sexual exploitation and abuse, by category

<i>Initiative/proposal</i>	<i>Status/proposed date of completion</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Impact</i>
Prevention			
1. Expansion of troop- and police-contributing countries certifying their personnel have received predeployment training support; updated core predeployment training materials (A/69/779, A/70/729 and A/70/357-S/2015/682)	Implementation ongoing	DFS	Member States are supported in their delivery of predeployment training by having strengthened materials
2. Development of an electronic tool for screening United Nations staff dismissed as a result of a substantiated allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse or who resigned or were dismissed during an investigation of sexual exploitation and abuse (A/69/779, A/70/729 and A/71/97)	Ongoing. Under development	DM, DFS and EOSG/OSC	Prevent the rehiring of staff with substantiated allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse
3. Where sexual exploitation and abuse is substantiated, suspended or outstanding payments related to individuals will not be paid from the notification of the incidents (A/69/779 and General Assembly resolutions 65/289 and 66/264)	Completed. Being implemented as necessary and there is no end target date. It is a rolling implementation	DFS	Sends a strong message to personnel that individual accountability will be enforced in cases of alleged sexual exploitation and abuse
4. The Secretary-General may repatriate a contingent or formed police unit commander without the possibility of further service where there is a documented pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse within the contingent (Security Council resolution 2272 (2016))	Being implemented as necessary and there is no end target date. It is a rolling implementation. The Secretariat developed operational guidance pursuant to Security Council resolution 2272 (2016)	DFS	Demonstrates the seriousness of the Organization's expectations of senior commanders; enhances individual accountability and command and control
5. Troop- and police-contributing countries are requested to appoint paternity focal points (A/69/779 and A/70/729)	No target date was given to Member States and action lies with them. The Secretariat regularly follows up with Member States. Some Member States have appointed paternity focal points; the Secretariat is following up with others	DFS	Significantly supports individual victims and children born as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse in navigating paternity and child support proceedings in Member States of personnel found to have committed sexual exploitation and abuse

<i>Initiative proposal</i>	<i>Status proposed date of completion</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Impact</i>
6. DNA sample collection protocol developed; missions provided with kits and guidance (A/69/779 and A/70/729)	Completed. Being implemented as appropriate. It is a rolling implementation.	DFS	Enables victims to advance paternity claims related to sexual exploitation and abuse
7. Member States asked to agree to obtain DNA samples of uniformed personnel alleged to have committed sexual exploitation and abuse (A/70/729)	No target date was given to Member States and action lies with them. The Secretariat regularly follows up with Member States. Some Member States have begun to implement this request	DFS	Will strengthen criminal accountability, as well as paternity and child support claims
8. Secretariat explores how technology solutions can support risk assessment and mitigation (A/70/729)	Under development. One aspect includes analysis of a technology survey projected to be completed in the third quarter of 2017	DFS	May allow for the use of innovative tools, for example, through the gathering of intelligence, to enhance risk management
9. The Secretary-General is developing guidance on referring possible criminal conduct to Headquarters and judicial authorities (host State or State of nationality) (A/69/779, A/70/729 and A/70/357-S/2015/682)	Ongoing. Draft guidance to be completed in the third quarter of 2017	DFS	Will enhance clarity within peace operations of how and when to trigger criminal accountability
10. Develop proposal for capacity to support resident coordinator on sexual exploitation and abuse prevention (A/69/779 and A/70/729)	Completed. Proposal shared with the High-level Committee on Management in October 2016. Under review by United Nations Development Group, for its endorsement	DFS	Would better allow for the resident coordinator to have dedicated resources to advance the system-wide measures to support and assist victims
11. Member States urged to receive claims from victims and establish mechanisms for doing so (A/70/729)	Recommended by the Secretary-General. Requires further engagement with Member States. Ongoing. No target date was given to Member States and action lies with them. The Secretariat regularly follows up with Member States	DFS	Victims would have the means to seek from Member States financial compensation for harm suffered as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse
12. Victims' Rights Advocate on board by 1 July (A/71/818, para. 27)	1 June 2017	OSC	
(a) ASG post			
(b) P and GS posts			
13. Circle of leadership, consisting of Heads of State (ibid., para. 18)	1 June 2017	OSC	
14. Standing advisory board. (ibid., para. 65)	1 June 2017	OSC	

<i>Initiative/proposal</i>	<i>Status/proposed date of completion</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Impact</i>
15. Chair of the Global Compact to create a business advisory group (ibid., para. 66)	1 June 2017	DFS	
16. Organize a high-level meeting on combating sexual exploitation and abuse before the end of 2017 (ibid., para. 18)	1 June 2017	OSC	
17. Compact between Secretary-General and individual Member States (ibid., para. 57)	1 June 2017	DFS	
18. Annual plan of action to combat sexual exploitation and abuse (ibid., para. 23)	1 June 2017	System-wide	
19. Risk assessments of each operational deployment (ibid., para. 23)	1 June 2017	System-wide	
20. Develop an annual written attestation on the United Nations code of conduct and the consequences of failing to abide by it (ibid., para. 37)	1 June 2017	DM/OHRM	
21. Include a clause in the personal history profile by which applicants agree that past records of employment with other United Nations entities may be accessed (ibid., para. 16)	1 October 2017	DM/OHRM	
22. Specify in all job openings and hiring letters the United Nations values and expectations of conduct and the consequences for misconduct (ibid., para. 15)	1 October 2017	DM/OHRM	
23. Require all staff members to acknowledge in writing, upon entry, reassignment and on a yearly basis, their knowledge and understanding of the United Nations standards of conduct, particularly regarding sexual exploitation and abuse, and the consequences for violating them (ibid., para. 15)	1 October 2017	DM/OHRM	
24. Enforce the policy on whistle-blowers and develop mechanisms to strengthen it (ibid., para. 44)	1 June 2017	Ethics Office	
25. Pre-deployment training on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse to be mandatory (ibid., para. 36)	1 June 2017	DFS/DPKO/ DSS/AFP	

<i>Initiative/proposal</i>	<i>Status/proposed date of completion</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Impact</i>
26. Manual on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse for senior leadership (ibid., para. 26)	1 June 2017	OSC	
27. Strengthen initial screening of candidates (ibid., para. 16)	1 June 2017	System-wide	
28. Launch a system-wide internal communications campaign on sexual exploitation and abuse (ibid., para. 23)	1 June 2017	DPI	
29. Provide innovative recommendations on the use of technology and social media to increase transparency and reporting on cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (ibid., para. 68)	1 October 2017	OICT	
30. Work closely with the Victims' Rights Advocate in formulating effective outreach strategies (ibid., para. 43)	1 October 2017	DPI	
31. Establish a system of public disclosures of credible allegations and follow-up measures (ibid., para. 69)	1 October 2017	DPI	
32. Report publicly and regularly on the status of proceedings and other States' actions on cases (ibid., para. 54)	1 June 2017	DPI/DFS	
33. Identify and launch a systemic mechanism to share and publicize the Member States' best practices and lessons learned (ibid., para. 56)	1 June 2017	DFS	
34. Foster and encourage Member State capacity building and learning, including facilitating troop- and police-contributing country cooperation on best practices (ibid., para. 53)	1 June 2017	DFS	
35. Resume monthly meetings of the High-level Steering Group (ibid., para. 75)	1 April 2017	EOSG	
36. Working group on sexual exploitation and abuse, to resume its work, in support of the High-level Steering Group (ibid., para. 75)	1 April 2017	OSC	
37. Outreach to local communities and strengthening of community-based complaint mechanisms (ibid., para. 42)	1 June 2017	DPI	

<i>Initiative proposal</i>	<i>Status proposed date of completion</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Impact</i>
38. Provide recommendations on how to best harness strategic communications to change the narrative on sexual exploitation and abuse and on increasing awareness-raising and education, system-wide (ibid., para. 67)	1 June 2017	DPI	
39. Work with organizations that have specialized expertise in combating online sexual exploitation and abuse, to intensify prevention efforts through outreach (ibid., para. 71)	1 June 2017	OICT	
Response:			
(a) Investigations			
40. The Secretary-General requested that troop-contributing countries appoint a national investigations officer within 5 days rather than the 10 days required under the model memorandum of understanding (A/70/729)	Completed. When the Secretariat informs troop-contributing countries (TCCs) of allegations through a note verbale, it has been requested that they appoint a national investigations officer within 5 days, when relevant, rather than the 10 days required under the model memorandum of understanding. In addition, the required amendment has been made to the statement of unit requirements to reflect the need for the deployment of a national investigations officer (with recognition for the need to be based on the size of deployment). Embedding national investigations officers allows for a faster response when investigations need to take place. Annex II to the report of the Secretary-General contains best practices and positive examples from TCCs with regard to national investigations officers (A/71/818)	DFS	Investigations are expedited by cutting delays inherent in the appointment and deployment of national investigations officers to peacekeeping missions
41. Member States requested to adopt a six-month timeline, as done by United Nations investigative entities in 2015. If urgent, time frame would be shortened to three months (A/69/779, A/70/729 and A/70/357-S/2015/682)	Completed. When the Secretariat informs TCCs of allegations, through a note verbale, they are requested to adopt a six-month timeline, as done by United Nations investigative entities in 2015. If urgent, the time frame is requested to be shortened to three months. The annex on best practices has positive examples from TCCs in that regard	DFS	Investigations are expedited, which encourages timely accountability

<i>Initiative/proposal</i>	<i>Status/proposed date of completion</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Impact</i>
42. Member States requested to establish on-site court-martial proceedings when allegations amount to sex crimes under national law (A/69/779, A/70/729, A/70/357-S/2015/682 and Security Council resolution 2272 (2016))	Completed. No target date was given to Member States and action lies with them. The Secretariat regularly follows up with Member States	DFS	On-site court-martial proceedings provide greater transparency and allow victims and communities to see accountability processes at work
43. Victims' Assistance Protocol to be tested in the field (A/71/818, para. 33).	1 June 2017	UNICEF	
44. Possibility of assistance payments to victims (ibid., para. 35)	1 June 2017	Controller	
45. Conclude deliberations to launch the pilot of uniform incident reporting form (ibid., para. 40)	1 June 2017	EOSG	
46. Identify and test mobile technologies and applications on reporting from persons in the field (ibid., para. 43)	1 October 2017	OICT	
47. Develop technology to permit the live streaming of and victims' access to courts martial (ibid., para. 59 (b) (xii))	1 October 2017	OICT	
48. Develop a programme of unannounced visits to field missions (ibid., para. 49)	1 June 2017	System-wide	
49. Develop the capacity to aggregate and analyse system-wide data associated with sexual exploitation and abuse, subject to funding (ibid., paras. 41 and 43)	1 October 2017	OICT	
50. Improve independence and quality of investigations (ibid., para. 39)	1 October 2017	OIOS	
51. Pooling investigative capacities regarding sexual exploitation and abuse (ibid., para. 45)	1 October 2017	OIOS	
52. Collection of DNA on a voluntary basis (ibid., para. 59 (b) (xiii))	1 October 2017	DFS	
(b) Accountability			
53. Where sexual exploitation and abuse is substantiated, suspended or outstanding payments related to individuals will not be paid from date of incident (A/70/729 and A/70/357-S/2015/682)	Completed. Member States are informed regularly, through note verbale in relevant situations, that where sexual exploitation and abuse is substantiated, suspended or outstanding payments related to individuals will not be paid from the date of incident	DFS	Sends a strong message to personnel that individual accountability will be enforced in cases of alleged sexual exploitation and abuse

<i>Initiative proposal</i>	<i>Status proposed date of completion</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Impact</i>
54. Secretary-General may repatriate a contingent or formed police unit commander without the possibility of further service where there is a documented pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse within the contingent (A/69/779 and Security Council resolution 2272 (2016))	Rolling implementation, as appropriate. The Secretary-General has taken action to repatriate in appropriate cases. The Security Council requested the Secretariat to develop operational guidance, further to resolution 2272 (2016), which was finalized and shared with the Security Council	DFS	Demonstrates the seriousness of the Organization's expectations of senior commanders; enhances individual accountability and command and control
55. Secretary-General to: (a) withhold service medals from units while misconduct under investigation; (b) consider repatriating the entire contingent or formed police unit where there is prima facie evidence of widespread or systemic violations by its members; (c) consider the individual under investigation for sexual exploitation and abuse as ineligible for premium for risk (A/68/813); (d) consider documented pattern of non-compliance by a Member State with regard to United Nations standards of conduct in determination of eligibility for a premium for enabling capacities; and (e) terminate deployment of uniformed personnel if there is a documented pattern of non-compliance with United Nations standards of conduct (A/69/779)	Completed (Secretary-General informed that he would do so in A/69/779). Rolling implementation as appropriate: policy (a), relating to the issuance of service medals, has been amended accordingly; (b)-(e) under implementation by the Secretary-General in appropriate cases. It is noted that the factors raised under (b)-(e) are reflected in Security Council resolution 2272 (2016) and the operational guidance	DFS	Reinforces the accountability of troop- and police-contributing countries; allows the Organization to mediate operational risks
56. Suspension of staff with credible Allegations of sexual exploitation and Abuse against them (A/71/818, para. 37)	1 June 2017	System-wide	
57. Ensure terminated personnel not be rehired in any other part of the United Nations system. (ibid., para. 16)	1 June 2017	System-wide	
58. Carry the "no excuses" card (ibid., para. 59 (a) (iv))	1 June 2017	OSC	
59. Special protocol of the Secretary-General on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (ibid., para. 36)	1 October 2017	OSC	
60. Annual management letters (ibid., para. 50)	1 October 2017	DM/OHRM	
61. Work with the Security Council members when deploying non-United Nations international forces and work with States to take preventative measures (ibid., para. 61)	1 October 2017	OHCHR	

<i>Initiative proposal</i>	<i>Status proposed date of completion</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Impact</i>
62. Notify the EOSG when follow-up attempts go unanswered by Member States regarding investigations (ibid., para. 54)	1 June 2017	OLA	
63. Establish as a system to release publicly, as a standard practice, facts about credible reports of sexual exploitation and abuse (ibid., para. 70)	1 June 2017	DPI	

Abbreviations: AFP, agencies, funds and programmes; ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; DFS, Department of Field Support; DM, Department of Management; DPI, Department of Public Information; DPKO, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DSS, Department of Safety and Security; EOSG, Executive Office of the Secretary-General; GS, General Service; OHCHR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; OHRM, Office of Human Resources Management; OICT, Office of Information and Communications Technology; OIOS, Office of Internal Oversight Services; OLA, Office of Legal Affairs; OSC, Office of the Special Coordinator; P, Professional; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; USG, Under-Secretary-General.

Annex II**Principles established by the General Assembly for the application of limited budgetary discretion by the Secretary-General**

In part III of its resolution 60/283, the General Assembly established the following principles for the application of limited budgetary discretion by the Secretary-General:

6. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General, on an experimental basis, a limited discretion for budgetary implementation for the bienniums 2006-2007 and 2008-2009, to enter into commitments up to 20 million United States dollars in each biennium for positions and non-post requirements for the purpose of meeting the evolving needs of the Organization in attaining its mandated programmes and activities;

[...]

8. *Decides* that the authorization referred to in paragraph 6 (limited budgetary discretion) above shall be implemented in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The experiment shall not be utilized for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses that are authorized in respect of the maintenance of peace and security;

(b) The experiment shall not imply any changes in the human resources management policies of the Organization;

(c) The proposed programme budget shall remain the principal instrument in which the Secretary-General sets out the resources and staffing requirements of the Organization, including the requirements for all reform proposals as agreed by Member States;

(d) The experiment shall in no way prevent the Secretary-General from requesting additional posts during the course of the experiment;

(e) The experiment shall not be implemented in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions calling for the implementation of decisions "within existing resources";

(f) The experiment shall not imply any changes to the provisions guiding the use of the contingency fund;

(g) The utilization of authorization shall be exercised with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions when the total amount utilized exceeds 6 million dollars per biennium;

(h) The experiment shall not alter the priorities of the Organization as agreed by the General Assembly;

(i) The utilization of the funds provided for under the experiment shall be subject to the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations;

[...]



**General Assembly
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**General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict**

**Security Council
Seventy-second year**

**Letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 8 April 2017 with regard to the recent massive U.S. missile attack on Syria (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Ja Song Nam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 8 April 2017 with regard to the U.S. missile attack on Syria

U.S. Missile Attack on Syria Unpardonable

The Trump administration, on 7 April 2017, mounted a massive missile attack on an air force base of the Syrian Government under the pretext that it had killed civilians by using chemical weapons.

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry, in a statement on April 8, termed this an act of aggression on a sovereign state that can never be tolerated.

Through the recent U.S. military attack on Syria, the world clearly sees who is the disturber and wrecker of peace.

Successive U.S. administrations have perpetrated strikes only at those countries that do not have nukes, styling themselves a superpower, and the same is true of the Trump administration.

Some forces are loud mouthed, saying that the recent U.S. military attack on Syria is an action of "warning" to the DPRK, but the latter is not frightened by such threat.

What happened in Syria once again taught a bitter lesson that no one should have illusions about the imperialists and that one can defend oneself from imperialist aggression only when one has strength.

Our tremendous military muscle, with a nuclear force as its pivot, serves as a treasured sword of justice for foiling the U.S. shameless high-handed and arbitrary practices and aggressive moves, protecting the sovereignty of the country and the right of the nation to existence.

The reality today goes to prove that any aggression should be countered with force alone and that the DPRK's choice is entirely just as it has bolstered its nuclear force remarkably.

The DPRK will increase its military capability for self-defence in every way to cope with the U.S. evermore reckless moves for a war and will defend itself with its own force.



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Security Council**

Distr.: General
12 April 2017

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**General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict**

**Security Council
Seventy-second year**

**Letter dated 5 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to attach herewith the commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the intention of the Russian Federation to introduce military conscription in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volodymyr Yelchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 5 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the intention of the Russian Federation to introduce military conscription in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expressed its strong protest to the Russian Federation against its intention to introduce military conscription in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

General Assembly resolution 71/205, of 19 December 2016, entitled "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)", established the fact of the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and called on the Russian Federation to ensure the fulfilment of its obligations under international humanitarian law, international mechanisms for the protection of human rights and other legal instruments to which it is a party.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine demanded the cancellation of the conscription of citizens who live in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as the strict observance of international obligations by the Russian side.

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Seventy-second year**

**Letter dated 7 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of
Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon the instructions of my Government I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces during the month of March 2017 (see annex I).*

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of ceasefire violations, registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic during the month of March 2017 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Zohrab Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Circulated in the language of submission only.



Annex I to the letter dated 7 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-31 March 2017

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons shot</i>
1 March	Tavush, Syunik regions	19	Small arms and light weapons: 517
	Aygedzor	10	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Paravakar	1	
	Kirants	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Voskevan	1	
	Shaghat	1	
2 March	Tavush, Syunik regions	13	Small arms and light weapons: 122
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 46
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Voskevan	1	
	Dovegh	2	
	Chapni	2	
3 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	51	Small arms and light weapons: 1,067
	Aygedzor	10	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 74
	Chinari	13	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Chinari 8; Aygedzor 8; Berdavan 4)
	Paravakar	2	
	Berdavan	7	
	Baghanis	4	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	2	
	Aygepar	5	
	Movses	2	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
	Vazashen	5	
	Geghamasar	1	
4 March	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	26	Small arms and light weapons: 450 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Chinari	5	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Chinari 6; Berdavan 3)
	Paravakar	2	
	Berdavan	7	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Dovegh	1	
	Chapni	4	
	Jil	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Chambarak	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
5 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	17	Small arms and light weapons: 108
	Aygedzor	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Chinari	5	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Aygedzor 12; Chinari 1)
	Paravakar	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 35 (Koti 25; Voskevan 10)
	Voskevan	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Koti	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
6 March	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 100 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12
	Chinari	7	
	Paravakar	1	
	Movses	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Vahan	1	
7 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 65
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons shots</i>
	Voskevan	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Chinari 3)
	Movses	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Azatamut	1	
	Voskepar	1	
	Kirants	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
8 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 121
	Chinari	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Kayan 7)
	Paravakar	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Vahan	1	
9 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 45 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Chinari	9	
	Paravakar	2	
10 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 180
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Vahan 3; Voskevan 8)
	N. Karmkiraghbyur	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	3	
	Voskevan	1	
	Vahan	3	
11 March	Tavush region	7	Small arms and light weapons: 168
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Chinari 10)
	Voskevan	1	
	Movses	1	
	Vahan	1	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
12 March	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 68
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 3
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Berdavan	1	
13 March	Tavush region	9	Small arms and light weapons: 362
	Chinari	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 62
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 350
	Berdavan	1	
14 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 230
	Chinari	7	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Paravakar	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Koti 3)
	Koti	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Kakhakan	1	
15 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat, Vayots Dzor regions	24	Small arms and light weapons: 138
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Chinari	7	Grenade launchers: 3
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Paravakar	3	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Baghanis	2	
	Berdavan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Yeraskh	1	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
	Khndzorut	1	
16 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 55
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Berdavan 1)
	Aygepar	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Paravakar	4	
	Vazshen	3	
	Berdavan	2	
17 March	Tavus, Gegharkunik regions	23	Small arms and light weapons: 589
	Chinari	7	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 42
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Aygedzor 15)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 108
	N. Karmiraghbyur	3	
	Paravakar	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Kirants	1	
	Voskepar	1	
	Vahan	2	
18 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 34
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Aygedzor	1	
	Movses	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Sevkar	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Yeraskh	2	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
19 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 56
	Chinari	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 35 (Chinari 35)
	Movses	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
20 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 63
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Chambarak	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
21 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	26	Small arms and light weapons: 494
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Aygedzor	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 40 (Chapni 40)
	Aygepar	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 13
	Movses	2	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Paravakar	5	
	Berkaber	3	
	Kayan	3	
	Koti	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Chapni	2	
	Jil	1	
22 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 233
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygedzor	5	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Aygedzor 11)
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Sarigyugh	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Jil	1	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
23 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 345
	Aygepar	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Kayan	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Nuzger 7; Ashagi Veysali 6)
	Voskevan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
24 March	Tavush region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 459
	Paravakar	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
	Barekamavan	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 13)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 570
25 March	Tavush region	8	
	Chinari	3	
	Movses	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Kayan	1	
26 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	6	Small arms and light weapons: 246
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Aygehovit	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Yusifjanli 6)
	Vazashen	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Jil	2	
27 March	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 327
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Mehdili 2; Kurapatkino 4)
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 5
28 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	13	Small arms and light weapons: 151
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Aygedzor 3)
	Paravakar	4	
	Berdavan	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
	Yeraskh	1	
29 March	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 19
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	3	
	Aygepar	1	
30 March	Tavush, Syunik regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 152
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30 (Chapni 30)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 190
	Paravakar	2	
	Kayan	1	
	Vazshen	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Chapni	3	
31 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 159 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Chinari	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	3	
	Chambarak	1	
	Tigranashen	1	

Annex II to the letter dated 7 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

1-31 March 2017

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
1 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	78	Small arms and light weapons: 1,025 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 44 Grenade launchers: 10 Small-calibre mortars: 10 (Karakhanbeyli 3; Seydakhmedli 1; Ashaghi Veysali 4; Namerli 2) Large-calibre mortars: 7 (Ashaghi Veysali 7) Artillery: 1 (Seysulan 1) multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS): 5 (Asaghi Veysali 5)
2 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	67	Small arms and light weapons: 963 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 103 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Talish 7) Large-calibre machine guns: 51 Grenade launchers: 24 Small-calibre mortars: 20 (Nuzger 2; Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 4; Ashaghi Veysali 2; Karvend 6; Yarmja 2; Verin Chaylu 4) MLRS: 7 (Karvend 7)
3 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	119	Small arms and light weapons: 1,942 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 41 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 24 (Nuzger 2; Seysulan 15; Talish 4; Gyulistan 3) Large-calibre machine guns: 7 Grenade launchers: 7 Small-calibre mortars: 99 (Talish 32; Bash Karvend 38; Kengerli 19; Shikhlyar 2; Sarijanli 1; Shurabad 1; Talish 6)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons shots</i>
4 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 333 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 24 (Nuzger 1; Gyulistan 23) Small-calibre mortars: 7 (Kurapatkino 2; Taghibeyli 3; Shikhlyar 2) Artillery: 2 (Bash Karvend 2)
5 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	34	Small arms and light weapons: 559 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27
6 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	41	Small arms and light weapons: 1,005 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Verin Chaylu 10) Large-calibre machine guns: 2 Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Yarmja 1)
7 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 1,170 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Levonarkh 3)
8 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons 401 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 71 (Horadiz 2; Mehdili 15; Kurapatkino 6; Bash Karvend 47; Jraberd 1)
9 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 433 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Bash Karvend 20; Taghibeyli 2)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons shots</i>
10 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 410 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 78 (Bash Karvend 78) Large-calibre machine guns: 60 Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Yarmja 1)
11 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	9	Small arms and light weapons: 95 Small-calibre sniper weapons 2 Grenade launchers: 3 Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Verin Chaylu 1)
12 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 68 Large-calibre machine guns: 3
13 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	39	Small arms and light weapons: 500 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 39 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Mehdili 1; Yusifjanli 6; Jraberd 4; Levonarkh 1; Verin Chaylu 3) Large-calibre machine guns: 1 Grenade launchers: 1
14 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	40	Small arms and light weapons: 613 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Darchinar 1; Shikhlyar 2) Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Mehdili 1; Nuzger 1)
15 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	42	Small arms and light weapons: 1,837 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Horadiz 4) Large-calibre machine guns: 35
16 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	26	Small arms and light weapons: 546 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Mehdili 3; Nuzger 5; Kurapatkino 2) Large-calibre machine guns: 1

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
17 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 549 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
18 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 201 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Mehdili 17) Large-calibre machine guns: 20
19 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 347 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
20 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 124 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Mehdili 7)
21 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	33	Small arms and light weapons: 325 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre machine guns: 17
22 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 358 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 37 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Verin Chaylu 1)
23 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	30	Small arms and light weapons: 345 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Nuzger 7; Ashagi Veysali 6)
24 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 459 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 13) Large-calibre machine guns: 57

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons shots</i>
25 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 1,134 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 19 (Mehdili 4; Kurapatkino 5; Bash Karvend 4; Levonarkh 6) Large-calibre machine guns: 350
26 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 246 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Yusifjanli 6)
27 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	30	Small arms and light weapons: 327 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Mehdili 2; Kurapatkino 4) Large-calibre machine guns: 5
28 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 400 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 42 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Shikhlyar 3)
29 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 561 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre machine guns: 4
30 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 450 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 24 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Mehdili 5; Yusifjanli 17)
31 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	47	Small arms and light weapons: 778 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 69 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (M. Karachuk 6; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 8; Yusifjanli 1; Gyulistan 2)

Three soldiers of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army were killed and four soldiers were wounded from the Azerbaijani side during the reporting period.



General Assembly

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Seventy-first session

Agenda item 115 (j)

**Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and
other appointments**

Confirmation of the appointment of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme

Note by the Secretary-General

1. In paragraph 22 of its resolution 1240 (XIII) B of 14 October 1958 on the establishment of the Special Fund, the General Assembly provided that the Secretary-General, after consulting the Governing Council of the Special Fund, would appoint the Managing Director, subject to confirmation by the Assembly. That procedure has been construed as applying also to the appointment of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

2. Following consultations with members of the Executive Board of UNDP, the Secretary-General wishes to request the General Assembly to confirm the appointment of Achim Steiner of Germany as Administrator of UNDP for a four-year term of office. The effective date of his appointment will be communicated to the Assembly at a later stage.



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Agenda item 149

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the
United Nations peacekeeping operations

**Triennial review of the rates and standards for
reimbursement to Member States for
contingent-owned equipment**

**Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions**

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the triennial review of the rates and standards for reimbursement to Member States for contingent-owned equipment (A/71/802) and the report of the 2017 Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment (A/C.5/71/20). During its consideration of the reports, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 16 March 2017.

2. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 54/19 B, the 2017 Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment met from 16 to 27 January 2017 to conduct a comprehensive review of reimbursement rates and standards for major equipment, self-sustainment and medical support services deployed to United Nations field operations. He also indicates that 331 technical, financial and medical experts from 76 Member States participated in the meeting of the 2017 Working Group.

3. In its report (A/C.5/71/20), the Working Group proposed new standards, definitions and reimbursement rates for the major equipment, self-sustainment and medical support services categories. That report provides a summary of the discussions and presents recommendations. In his report, the Secretary-General sets out the cost implications of implementing the recommendations of the Working Group and includes, in annex I thereto, a summary of the recommendations contained in the report of the 2017 Working Group's. The Secretary-General recommends approval of all the recommendations. In annex II to his report, the Secretary-General sets out the estimated financial implications for 2017/18 of each



measure that would require additional resources. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on the costs related to the recommendations of the 2011 and 2014 Working Groups (see A/65/800 and A/68/830, respectively). This information shows that the projected costs of implementing the recommendations were higher than the actual costs incurred during the year following their adoption (2011/12 and 2014/15, respectively). **The Advisory Committee recommends approval of the recommendations of the 2017 Working Group, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/71/802).**

II. Financial implications of the triennial review

4. The report of the Secretary-General (A/71/802) determines that, should the General Assembly approve the recommendations of the 2017 Working Group, the estimated additional resources for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 would be \$13,595,323 from the baseline requirements of \$915 million for major equipment and self-sustainment for the 2016/17 peacekeeping financial period (A/71/802, para. 7).

5. The proposed resource increase is attributable mainly to the following proposals:

(a) A net average increase of 0.6 per cent in the reimbursement rates for major equipment provided under a wet lease and self-sustainment which would entail additional annual costs estimated at \$5,490,355 (A/71/802, para. 7);

(b) A change in the computation of the compensation for loss or damage due to hostile action or forced abandonment. The Working Group recommended that the total additional cost across all missions for the associated expenses for each year should not exceed \$5 million (*ibid.*, para. 40);

(c) A change in the computation of the hostile action and/or forced abandonment mission factor, including an increase in the maximum level of the factor from 5 to 6 per cent, which would amount to an annual increase requirement estimated at \$3,557,175 (*ibid.*, para. 42);

(d) A new reimbursement scheme for units at the rapid deployment level of the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, which replaced the United Nations Standby Arrangements System in July 2015. The estimated annual cost of this change would be \$3,881,582 (*ibid.*, paras. 23 and 24).

6. According to the report of the Secretary-General, the proposed increase in requirements will be partially offset under the recommendations of the Working Group that some of the conditions applying to the rotation of contingent-owned equipment at United Nations expense be modified. As some of the proposed conditions would be more restrictive (for instance, the total annual expenses related to the rotation of equipment would be lowered from \$12.5 million to \$8 million), this would result in a decreased requirement of \$4.5 million. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that during the 2014/15 and 2015/16 periods, only \$1.9 million and \$3.4 million, respectively, were actually spent on rotation.

7. The Working Group also recommended, *inter alia*, (a) the inclusion, in the Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions, of (i) new types of generators (which would supplement existing generators), based on the power ratings under the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 8528 series standards, and (ii) additional

renewable energy systems; (b) the introduction of three classes of unmanned aerial systems, with the items in one class considered contingent-owned equipment; and (c) that reimbursement for equipment donated to a troop- or police-contributing country be limited to the maintenance rate and no fault incident factor (A/71/802, paras. 11, 13 and 21).

8. Additionally, the Working Group proposes changes to medical services including (a) an augmentation of equipment for aeromedical evacuation modules, to be deployed as two fully equipped sub-teams, which would increase requirements in the amount of \$202,070; (b) introduction or upgrade of equipment in medical facilities, which would reduce requirements by \$35,959; (c) introduction of new modules; and (d) inclusion of surgery in the fee-for-service schedule (A/71/802, paras. 15-18).

III. Other issues

Memorandums of understanding

9. With regard to memorandums of understanding, the Working Group recommends that contributing countries and the United Nations Secretariat make all efforts to finalize outstanding memorandums and letters of assist. As at 1 February 2017, there were 30 draft memorandums of understanding under negotiation with 20 contributing countries for units currently deployed to peacekeeping missions. The Working Group also recommends the inclusion of statements of unit requirements, which would define the operational capabilities and tasks to be undertaken by a unit, in annexes to memorandums of understanding. A memorandum of understanding would therefore constitute an agreement that the personnel, equipment and self-sustainment provided by the contributing countries were sufficient to deliver the capabilities specified by statements of unit requirements, at the required standard, and to perform the expected tasks (A/71/802, para. 44).

Internet access

10. With regard to the provision of Internet access, the COE Manual specifies that units must deploy with appropriate levels of equipment and bandwidth, for which troop- and police-contributing countries receive \$3.14 per person per month. The Working Group proposed that, for the meeting of the 2020 Working Group, the Secretariat provide data on the cost of providing Internet access to contingents (A/71/802, para. 32).

Environmental footprint

11. As mentioned in paragraph 7 above, the Working Group recommended that new types of generators based on their power ratings under ISO 8528 series standards be included in the COE Manual. Troop- and police-contributing countries may opt to be reimbursed for generators deployed based on the ISO 8528 ratings. Moreover, the Working Group recommends the addition of renewable energy systems, in particular solar photovoltaic systems, to the Manual (A/71/802, para. 11). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that upgrading to the new generators and adding the photovoltaic system could reduce by 27 per cent the annual cost of generating electricity for a battalion-sized camp situated in a remote location within a typical United Nations peacekeeping mission, compared with the cost incurred under the current standards for diesel generator equipment.

Pre-session of the Working Group

12. The Secretariat suggests that a pre-session organizational meeting of the 2020 Working Group be convened in late October 2019, prior to the substantive session, to be held in January 2020. According to the Secretariat, the proposal that a pre-session meeting be held, which is based on a recommendation of the Chairman of the 2017 Working Group, would, if adopted, facilitate a more efficient use of time during the main session by allowing the Group to focus on substantive issues.

13. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the General Assembly, in its resolution 54/19 B of 15 June 2000, had decided that the Working Group should convene the following year (2001) for not less than 10 working days. In its resolution 55/274 of 14 June 2001, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to convene, in 2004, an open-ended working group of experts, for a period of no less than 10 working days, to hold a triennial review of reimbursement rates for contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment, including medical services.

14. The Advisory Committee was also informed that there is no clear legislative decision limiting the meeting of the Working Group to a period of 10 working days, and that the period of 10 working days, in January, every three years, has become a norm based on precedent. The only exception in this regard occurred when the 2008 Working Group met for 14 working days, in accordance with Assembly resolution 59/298 of 22 June 2005, to carry out a "comprehensive review of the contingent-owned equipment system" (para. 4). The Committee was further informed that both the Committee on Conferences and the Committee for Programme and Coordination hold pre-session organizational meetings.

15. **The Advisory Committee recommends approval of the recommendation of the Chair of the 2017 Working Group that a pre-session organizational meeting of the 2020 Working Group be held in October 2019, prior to the substantive session, to be convened in January 2020.**

IV. Conclusion

16. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are listed in paragraphs 50 (a) to (bb) of the report of the Secretary-General (A/71/802). **Subject to its recommendation above, the Advisory Committee recommends approval of the recommendations of the 2017 Working Group, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/71/802).**